In this article, we enable the coexistence of multiple wireless body area networks (BANs) using a finite repeated non-cooperative game for transmit power control. With no coordination amongst these personal sensor networks, the proposed game maximizes each network's packet delivery ratio (PDR) at low transmit power. In this context, we provide a novel utility function, which gives reduced benefit to players with higher transmission power, and a subsequent reduction in radio interference to other coexisting BANs. Considering the purpose of inter-BAN interference mitigation, PDR is expressed as a compressed exponential function of inverse signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio, so it is essentially a function of transmit powers of all coexisting BANs. It is shown that a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists, and hence there is a subgameperfect equilibrium, considering best response at each stage independent of history. In addition, the NE is conjectured to be the socially optimal solution according to all possible action profiles. Realistic and extensive on-and inter-body channel models are employed. Results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in better interference management, greater reliability, and reduced transmit power when compared with other schemes that can be applied in BANs.
INTRODUCTION
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The increasing popularity of BAN has resulted in a rapid growth in active devices since the early 2010s [Lewis 2008; ABIresearch 2011] . Considering the typical circumstance of using BANs, it is often necessary to have several BAN systems operating in close proximity to each other. However, the transmission power of BAN sensor nodes is strictly limited to prolong their operation lifetime [Astrin et al. 2012] , which, however, makes the system vulnerable to radio interference from other BANs. Therefore, BANs coexistence and the resultant inter-BAN interference is a major issue, which can cause severe performance degradation and packet loss as shown in Deylami and Jovanov [2012] , Wang and Cai [2011] , and Martelli and Verdone [2012] . In addition, inter-BAN interference is a cause of energy wastage of sensor nodes trying to compete for better signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs).
There have been many studies on effective interference management schemes in wireless networks [Douros and Polyzos 2011] . Many techniques involve transmission power control that is based on a centralized [Zander 1992b; Wu 1999] and partially distributed [Zander 1992a ] approach. They are effective in the context of cellular networks and general large-scale ad hoc networks [Lin et al. 2006 ] as these networks have fewer resource constraints and a stabler network topology. In Xua et al. [2015] , a centralized inter-network power control scheme, named C-MIR, is proposed particularly for BAN to achieve the goals of reducing in the interference amongst BANs. It works well when the coexistence is relatively static. However, if the coexisting BANs are highly dynamic, which is typically the case, the connection between the control center and the hubs in BANs will be unreliable using the method in Xua et al. [2015] . In Lee and Lin [1996] and Foschini and Miljanic [1993] , fully distributed power control schemes were proposed, which we refer to as SINR balancing in this article. SINR balancing works well for distributed cellular mobile systems, but their performance is unknown for BANs. More recently, game-theoretic-based resource allocation schemes have been widely proposed for various types of wireless networks from spectrum allocation [Candogan et al. 2010; Seneviratne and Leung 2011] to transmit power control algorithms [Ozel and Uysal-Biyikoglu 2009 ]. This article is inspired by the study presented in , where a game-based power control model was proposed for general distributed wireless networks. It was evaluated over models of static channels and slow Rayleigh fading channels. It is noted that even though the compressed exponential approximation to packet delivery ratio is inherited from , and the utility function is somewhat similar (although changed) to that in , the model is optimized specifically for BAN in this article. Considering the very unique characteristics of the body-centric channel typically present in BANs, this article presents the required new theoretical evaluation, and new performance analysis and evaluation, which all differ considerably from that in .
In the context of BAN, the use of game theory has become popular in recent years, and it has been applied in many ways. In a node-level game strategy within a BAN, Misra et al. [2015] presents a Nash Bargaining Solution, which is proposed within a BAN to improve the overall network performance amongst multiple heterogeneous sensors that have different transmission priority and minimum data rate requirements. With centralised control at a global BAN coordinator, it is shown that this approach can improve the data rate for critical sensors by an average of 10%. Similarly, in Misra and Sarkar [2014] , the same author proposes a priority-based time-slot allocation in BAN considering some critical properties of a packet and its local data processing unit (LDPU). This fair game strategy can reduce the number of transmitting LDPUs by 25.97% and reduce the packet drop rate and energy dissipation. Not only node-level game strategies, many of the game-based schemes in BAN aim to solve the consequence of multiple BANs' coexistence. Shin et al. [2012] raises the issue of overlapping transmission in the contention free period if multiple BANs occupy the same channel. The authors in Shin et al. [2012] proposed a cooperative game model based on a Cournot game, where a player knows other's information before a game repetition. Coexisting BANs select their actions, which is a certain way of channel allocation, to maximise the QoS including throughput, delay, and traffic priority. In Kazemi et al. [2010] , Kazemi presented an interference mitigation scheme using game-based power control games for BANs with limited cooperation amongst networks over static channels. A similar power control approach, ProActive Power Update, which incorporates limited coordination, is illustrated in Fang et al. [2010] .
To better model the scenario of multiple uncoordinated BANs coexistence as shown in Figure 1 and considering the difficulty in finding a global coordinator among BANs, they are modeled as self-interested and rational players competing for resources (shared channel) in a non-cooperative game. In contrast to the existing game-based work as presented before, there is completely no coordination amongst BANs. We employ a local non-cooperative power control game at each BAN. It uses a novel price-dependent utility function to determine the next superframe's transmission power, which provides a unique Nash Equilibrium. As the IEEE 802.15.6 standard clearly specifies a maximum packet error rate of 10%, packet delivery ratio (PDR) is used as the target utility. Hence, by maximizing the utility function, a higher PDR can be achieved. The instantaneous PDR is expressed as a compressed exponential function of SINR, which is essentially a function of all transmit powers of coexisting BANs. Obviously, by raising its transmit power, a self-interested BAN can achieve a better utility outcome if the other BANs keep their transmit powers unchanged. However, if every BANs in the range do so, then both local and aggregate utilities get worse due to larger interference experienced. Therefore, a proper pricing function is employed to restrain this behavior by penalizing utilities of BANs with high transmit power. In our work, the dynamic body movement and shadowing, typically experienced in BAN Smith et al. , 2011a Cotton and Scanlon 2006] are accurately modeled for a better simulation of coexistence.
This article makes the following novel contributions:
-We introduce a non-cooperative game-theoretic transmit power control scheme for BANs to maximize the local packet delivery ratio across multiple BANs while reducing average transmit power. -We model the packet delivery ratio of a typical BAN system in terms of instantaneous SINR using a compressed exponential function. -The performance of the proposed power control scheme is evaluated using realistic on-and inter-body time-selective channel models, which is the typical operating environment for the BANs. -The implementation of this game results in a unique Nash Equilibrium that additionally provides a socially optimal outcome across all coexisting BANs.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, the details of the system setup and channel models are explained. Section 3 defines the non-cooperative game for multiple BANs coexistence, describes our novel utility function, and shows the unique Nash Equilibrium, as well as the socially optimal outcome of the game. In Section 4, the performance of this power control method is assessed and compared with other schemes. Finally, in Section 5, some concluding remarks are made. Table I lists all symbols used in this article.
SYSTEM MODEL

Table of Notations
BANs Coexistence Based on Probability of Overlapping
We consider multiple subjects in the proximity of each other, each wearing a typical star-topology BAN. The IEEE 802.15.6 standard not only limits the medium access to CSMA/CA, but also provides a great flexibility to adapt the medium access according to various requirements [Astrin et al. 2012] . As in classical healthcare BAN systems, Time division multiple access (TDMA) is employed as the intra-BAN access scheme for each BAN. In practice, this can be implemented with the scheduled access scheme specified in the 802.15.6 standard as noted in Boulis et al. [2012] . Here, the period of time between hub broadcasting a beacon and all sensors completing transmission in a round-robin fashion is defined to be a superframe T d . It is followed by an idle period T idle , during which sensors are inactive and waiting for next beacon. In terms of the inter-BAN access scheme, a unsynchronized TDMA scheme is used as we assume no coordination exists amongst networks [Zhang et al. 2010] . In this concept, the channel is temporally divided into N c orthogonal channels (time slots) and each time slot has a length of T d . BAN i chooses its transmission starting time of a superframe independently and randomly following a uniform distribution over [0, (N c 
where T beacon,i is the time between two consecutive beacons from the hub of BAN i.
Here, we assume S is the set of all M BANs located in close proximity, which consists 
Parameters of the SINR vs. PDR approximation and simplified approximation dist o , dist ij Reference distance; distance between subjects (BANs) i and j
Utility function of the proposed cooperative power control game 
where | · | represents the number of element in a set. Therefore, the probability of m BANs transmitting Pr(|S active | = m) 1 is obtained from a binomial distribution:
where m ∈ [1, M], N c ≥ 2 Figure 2 shows the probability of m BANs transmitting concurrently with eight BANs (M = 8) coexisting. Different colors correspond to the varying number of orthogonal channels available. In this study, the proposed power control game is simulated over many occasions with different channels, wherein each occasion the value of m is chosen randomly following the probability distribution {Pr(|S active | = m)}. By introducing this probability distribution, it also models the mobility of BANs for multiple networks coexistence as BANs can leave and also enter the area of interest.
SINR-Based Packet Delivery Ratio
At any time, a given sensor in each BAN transmits concurrently with sensor nodes in other m − 1 BANs. Hence, for each BAN, the hub receives not only the signal packet from its own given sensor node but also m− 1 interfering signal packets. Therefore, the SINR over a signal packet at the hub of BAN i, γ i (τ ), is calculated as follows:
where p i (τ ) is the transmission power of a sensor in the ith BAN at time τ ; h i j represents the average channel gain across a packet time from the sensor in BAN j to the hub in BAN i, in other words, the interference channel from interferer j to network i. In terms of h i i , it is the average on-body channel gain from the sensor to its connected hub in BAN i in the same time interval.
Observing that the graph of general PDR vs. SINR is a sigmoidal function, it is possible to express the PDR as a compressed exponential function of inverse SINR, 1/γ , given in Equation (6), where we note that the parameters a c and in particular differ from those specified in . In Equation (6), γ is calculated as in Equation (5), and a c and b c are constant parameters depending on particular modulation, coding scheme, and packet length. Complying with the IEEE 802.15.6 standard [Astrin et al. 2012] , BCH(31,19) coding (Bose, Chaudhuri, and Hocquenghem Codes) and a DPSK/BPSK (Differential/Binary Phase Shift Keying) modulation scheme are applied with a packet length of 256 bytes. It is found that BCH(31, 19) provides about 2dB channel coding gain as shown in Figure 3 ; this advantage is considered when estimating the PDR vs. SINR relation. 2 With a root-mean-square error of the approximation less than 0.006, Figure 4 shows the comparison between the approximated and simulated PDR vs. SINR relation for DPSK and BPSK, respectively. For later simplicity of analysis, we can rearrange the equation to be expressed as Equation (7), where a = −(1/a c ) b c and b = −b c . The values of a and b are given as in Table II (6)) and Its Simplified Form (Equation (7) 
= exp aγ b ,
3. NON-COOPERATIVE POWER CONTROL GAME
Game Definition
In this multiple BANs coexistence game, each BAN network makes an independent decision on the transmit power of the next packet, for the given sensor for which it is optimizing, based on current SINR received for that given sensor at the hub. Here each BAN is treated as a player in a non-cooperative repeated game G = {N, P, U }, where:
(1) N = {1, 2, . . . , m} is a finite set of players indexed by i. N represents the same set as S active ; (2) P represents the global strategy space, which is the Cartesian product of all players' strategy spaces, that is, P = P 1 × P 2 ×· · ·×P m . The pure strategy set of player i, P i , is a finite set of discrete transmit powers in the range of [P min i , P max i ]. The action of player i at any time(stage) τ is denoted as p i (τ ) ∈ P i , and p −i stands for the choice of transmission power of other players except player i;
(3) The utility function U i is defined in terms of the current transmission power p i (τ ) and packet delivery ratio PDR. Its objective is to maximize the PDR while minimizing the transmit power. It is defined as follows:
where pdr i is a function of SINR and thus a function of the transmit powers of all players according to Equations (6) and (5). Hence, U ( p i , pdr i ) can be rearranged and expressed as U ( p i , p −i ). The exponents v i > 0 and w i > 0 depend on the particular network configuration and can be varied accordingly. The weighting factor d i > 0 can be adjusted depending on the current network status. At the end of every time slot, players (BANs) update their transmit power levels to maximize the outcome from applying the utility function based on the latest transmit power and the current SINR:
where
Nash Equilibrium
An important condition for the non-cooperative game to converge is that a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium of the defined game are proved as follows.
Definition 1. The action profile p * = ( p * 1 , p * 2 , . . . , p * m ) ∈ P is a Nash Equilibrium if, for all players, p * i is a best response to p −i * . In the other words, there exists U (1) [P min i , P max i ] is a nonempty, convex and compact subspace of a Euclidean space R m .
(2) The utility function (Equation (8)) is continuous in the domain [P min i , P max i ]. This can be shown by taking the first derivative of the utility function and substituting Equations (7) and (5):
where I −i is the interference and noise power experienced at the hub of player i. Based on Equation (5), we can derive the relation γ i
Since
] is real and pdr i is non-zero according to the approximation shown in Equation (7), the first derivative function is defined. Therefore, Theorem 1 is proved. THEOREM 2. The Nash Equilibrium at each stage in the non-cooperative power control game G is unique when d i > 0. With the unique Nash Equilibrium at each stage, which is independent of history, there is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium.
PROOF. To show that the Nash Equilibrium point p i is unique in the range of [P min i , P max i ], it is sufficient to check the concavity of the utility function U ( p i , pdr i ) by taking the second derivative,
. Due to the fact that p i is always positive, the first part of Equation (14) has a negative value as long as the constraint of exponent w i >= 1 is satisfied. In addition, since v i > 0, and a and b are both negative and SINR, c i , and PDR are always positive, the second part of Equation (14) is always negative. The addition of these two parts means the second derivative δ 2 U i
Therefore, the function U ( p i , pdr i ) is concave and has a local maximum at p * i that occurs at the point δU δp i = 0. In other words, the Nash Equilibrium at each stage of this game is unique. Furthermore at any given stage, it can be seen that this equilibrium is independent of the history, and, hence, there is a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Social Optimality and Pareto Optimality
As the existence and uniqueness of the NE of the defined non-cooperative game has been proved, the efficiency of operating at the NE now needs to be determined. It should be noted that a NE, as per Definition 1, is the best response in a single player's point of view, given the decisions of the other players. However, in the proposed non-cooperative game, there is imperfect information as the other BANs' transmit power for the current time slot is unknown. Therefore, it predicts other BANs' actions based on the latest aggregate interference power received. Additionally, as players in the game act in their own self-interest, there is no guarantee that the decision is optimal from a social point of view or even from an individual BAN's perspective. Therefore, the efficiency of the NE solution is characterized as follows:
Definition 2 (Pareto Optimality). A joint action profile p * = ( p * 1 , p * 2 , . . . , p * m ) ∈ P is a Pareto optimal (efficient) outcome to user i if there is no other joint action profile p ∈ P such that U i (p) ≥ U i (p * ).
Definition 3 (Social Optimallty). A joint action profile p * = ( p * 1 , p * 2 , . . . , p * m ) ∈ P is a socially optimal (efficient) outcome if there is no other joint action profile p ∈ P such
is the social welfare of the game. As p * leads to the maximal social welfare, it is socially optimum and therefore is also Pareto efficient [Bemporad et al. 2010 ]. In the context of BANs' coexistence, achieving Pareto Optimality means no single coexisting BAN can get improvement in reliability without harming the other BANs' reliability performance. In this article, we would like to show that the action profile p * = ( p * 1 , p * 2 , . . . , p * m ) at the NE point is indeed socially optimal. This can be observed by comparing the social welfare, that is, the aggregate utility outcome of Equation (8), obtained with all different action profiles p ∈ {P = P 1 × P 2 × · · · × P m }. CONJECTURE 1. When all BANs are operating at the unique Nash Equilibrium shown in Theorem 2, then, according to Definition 3, the outcome of the proposed power control game is socially optimal. PROOF. Following Equation (8), it may appear that the maximum social welfare that the game can achieve is when all BANs transmit at the lowest power, that is, −30dBm, and meanwhile achieve a PDR of 1. However, due to the on-body channel attenuation and inter-BAN interference, it is generally impossible to achieve this. With exhausted comparing among all possible action profiles p at each time slot, the maximum possible social welfare is plotted as the black dashed line in Figure 5 . It matches the social welfare reached with actual action profile p * determined at the unique NE, which is indicated as the red dots in Figure 5 . Additionally, Figure 5 also shows the social welfare of a large agglomerate of randomly sampled action profiles in the blue shaded area, which are all below the actual social welfare of the game. It is noted that the aggregate utility achieved at time slot 0 is not the optimal social welfare, since the initial transmit power of all BANs are randomly chosen in the range of [−30, 0] dBm. According to all possible observations, the Nash Equilibrium is therefore conjectured to be socially optimal and hence also Pareto optimal.
Algorithm Description
In this section, an iterative and distributed power control game that determines each BAN's transmission power at time τ is described as in Algorithm 1.
CHANNEL MODEL
To evaluate the performance of the proposed game-based power control algorithm, extensive on-and inter-body channels are modeled for narrowband communications at a carrier frequency of 2.4GHz. Each BAN consists of any number of wireless nodes, with sensors at suitable locations on the body, with one hub centrally located, such as at the chest or left/right hips, and single-hop communication. We simulate the scenarios 
ALGORITHM 1: The Proposed Distributed Non-Cooperative Power Control Game
(1) In BAN i, a given sensor transmits a packet with p i (τ ). When τ = 0, p i (0) ∈ [P min i , P max i ] is randomly chosen. If τ > 0, then p i (τ − 1) is determined in the previous iteration at τ − 1;
(2) Hub in BAN i (i ∈ N) calculates the SINR γ i (τ ) of the received packet as (5);
(3) Estimate the instantaneous PDR pdr i (τ ) with γ i (τ ) based on the PDR vs. SINR approximation (7); (4) As (9),determine the transmission power for that given sensor at τ + 1, p i (τ + 1) ∈ [P min i , P max i ], which gives the maximum value of U ( p i , pdr i (τ )); in which a random number of BANs are coexisting and moving in arbitrary directions. Since the same network topology is used in each BAN, it is a reasonable assumption that on-body channels are independent and identically distributed for all players. The gamma distribution can characterize the general everyday on-body channel of a BAN [Smith et al. 2011a ], so gamma fading, for any given sensor to hub link, is employed with a mean 60dB attenuation, and as in Smith et al. [2011a] with a shape parameter of 1.31, and a scale parameter of 0.562, which considers the effect of body shadowing and BAN channel dynamics.
In terms of the inter-body interfering channel, we start with representing the movement of a player by a series of (x(τ ), y(τ )) coordinates updated every 20ms, where a total of 10,000 samples are modeled, which is equivalent to 200s simulation time. The initial positions of players are randomly chosen within a 6 × 6m 2 square area 3 that corresponds to the requirements in the standard [Astrin et al. 2012] , and the initial walking directions of the players are also random. Therefore, the model considers subjects not only walking towards each other but also moving apart. During their movement, a random small turning angle is introduced to model a realistic walking pattern of an individual. In addition, an average walking speed of 3m/s with 0.2m/s standard deviation is applied. This walking model enables us to calculate the distance between two players i and j at any instant throughout the simulation. The channel attenuation is then calculated based on path loss model, body shadowing, and small scale fading,
assuming a path loss exponent of 2.7 between BANs. 4 dist ij represents the distance between players i and j, andthe reference distance dist 0 = 5m corresponds to a channel attenuation A t of 54dB. We consider the average case where body shadowing contributes approximately A BS = 45dB attenuation and adopt a Jakes' model with Doppler spread of 1.1Hz as the Rayleigh distribution for the small scale fading A SC between BANs.
SIMULATION ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the proposed non-cooperative power control game, we implement our simulation in the Matlab platform to extensively repeat the coexistence game. One individual repeated game consists of 100 repeated game-playing stages. Twenty sets of channels are generated with Matlab based on the description in Section 4. Because of the random moving velocity, the walking pattern varies between different channel model sets. With each set, the same 100-stage game is played on 50 occasions, using different segments of the data. Therefore, a total of 1,000 games, each with 100 stages, are conducted. Here, a maximum of eight BAN networks located in the vicinity is simulated, that is, M = 8 in Equation (4). At any time during the simulation, a various number of BANs are active with the others idle. The actual number of networks transmitting concurrently follows the probability distribution P m described in Equation (4), and this number is fixed for all game stages of a given occasion of playing a repeated game. The case of m = 0 is neglected as the case of no network transmitting is irrelevant. In terms of inter-BAN TDMA scheme, we assume that four orthogonal channels (N c = 4) are used. In addition, to investigate the effect of a given number of coexisting BANs on the performance of the proposed algorithm, constant numbers of BANs coexisting are also simulated, with the number coexisting from 2 to 8 each run on 1,000 occasions. The exponents in the utility function v i and w i are set to be 4 and 1, respectively, ∀i, and the weighting factor in the utility function d i = 0.1 ∀i, which give the optimal outcomes for the game. Based on the same configuration and channel models, we compare the proposed game with some other schemes commonly applied in BAN. The comparison is based on two criteria: (i) percentage of BANs reaching the target PDR and (ii) transmission power at each stage. Here, we use (i) as a performance metric, instead of average PDR achieved across all coexisting BAN, because the reliability improvements in a global point of view are more of a concern. Comparing average PDR neglects the difference between BANs with extremely good PDR performance and BANs with bad PDR performance. In contrast, more BANs reaching the target PDR indicates a better and more robust coexistence. The result is averaged across all 1,000 games. Complying to the IEEE 802.15.6 standard [Astrin et al. 2012] , the target PDR is set to be 0.9. The rest of the schemes are Sample-and-Hold [Smith et al. 2011b; Dong and Smith 2014] , SINR-Balancing [Foschini and Miljanic 1993; Lee and Lin 1996] , and constant transmission power at 0/−5/−10dBm. Here in Sample-and-Hold, current SINR is used for each BAN to set its' next transmission power, unlike in Dong and Smith [2014] , where it is done with respect to channel gain. Here in Sample-and-Hold, the transmission power is adjusted based on the latest packet's SINR to attempt to achieve the target SINR for the next packet.
All power control methods are applied and plotted in Figures 6 and 7 , using BPSK and DPSK modulations, respectively, for the case where the number of concurrently transmitting BANs follows the probability distribution P m (4). From Figure 6(a) , it is shown that using the proposed game-based power control method, approximately 93% of the BANs are able to achieve the target PDR of 0.9 while this number is only 80% and 77% for Sample-and-Hold and SINR-Balancing methods. Constant transmission at different power levels shows similar performance to each other with about 87% achieving target PDR. In terms of the time taken to converge to the steady-state minimized transmit power, the proposed method and Sample-and-Hold achieve this 16 time slots ahead of SINR-Balancing. For the power control game and Sampleand-Hold scheme, the number of iteration until settling is approximately 10 time slots, which is equivalent to 0.2s with a sampling frequency T s = 20ms. The short convergence time of the first two algorithms ensures that they can quickly respond to time variations in the target channel and also interference, which is typical for BAN operation. In terms of the output transmit power shown in Figure 6(b) , the game has an average of −25dBm while Sample-and-Hold is about −23dBm. SINR-Balancing has 2dB less in average transmission power compared with our proposed method. However, with its poor performance in percentage of BANs reaching the target and slow response time, it is not a suitable choice for enabling BANs' coexistence. Further, the game has at least 15dB less average transmission power than the constant power transmission. Similar output transmit powers can be observed in Figure 7 (a) when DPSK is employed. In this case, the percentage of BANs reaching the target PDR is 92%, 85%, 76%, and 74% for the proposed algorithm, constant power transmission, Sample-and-Hold, and SINR-Balancing respectively. Since all the calculations for the optimal transmit power are performed at the hub, which has significantly fewer power constraints than sensors, sensors adjust their transmit power as indicated by the hub. Therefore, the added power control game to the BAN system does not introduce additional power consumption. Further, most of the energy used on a sensor is during the transmit mode [Shakir et al. 2007 ]. Thus, reducing transmit power improves the lifetime of the sensor radio.
Next, we show the effect of changing the number of players on the performance of the proposed power control game. Figure 8 shows the comparison when the number m of coexisting BANs is fixed, m ∈ [2, 8], with respect to the previous criteria. The same simulation parameters (exponents v = 4 and w = 1, weighting factor calculation d i ) are used for different values of m. It is observed that the average percentage of BANs reaching the target PDR of 0.9 decreases with increasing m, from 97% to 83%. In Figure 8(a) , the intercept point of the red broken line and each solid line indicates the approximate time slot for game convergence, which shows that the more players who join the game, the longer it takes for the game to converge. In Figure 8(b) , we can see that transmit power rises from −27dBm to −21dBm as m increases from 2 to 8. Note that the performance of the proposed algorithm for different values of m always outperforms any of the previously described schemes described previously in the case of the average percentage of BANs reaching the target. Although SINR balancing uses slightly smaller transmit power, it sacrifices a lot in terms of reliability.
CONCLUSION
Wireless BANs have been pervasively used in many areas. For these personal sensor networks, with no global coordination amongst multiple closely located networks, there can be severe performance degradation. For better interference management, a non-cooperative power control game has been proposed to enable coexistence amongst BANs. In this game, a novel utility function that constrains output transmit power is applied for each player. The unique Nash Equilibrium, which is conjectured also to be a socially optimal solution, and sub-game perfect equilibrium leads to a converged outcome after a small number of stages, in terms of all BANs reaching the target packet delivery ratio at the lowest possible transmit power. Based on extensive simulation over different instantiations of a realistic channel model, our proposed scheme can achieve a significantly higher number of BANs more rapidly reaching target PDR than other power control methods that are typically employed in distributed wireless networks. In addition, the lower circuit power consumption, as result of lower transmit power using the proposed game, can significantly prolong the lifetime of the battery of the sensor radio. Finally, increasing the number of coexisting BANs only degrades the performance of the proposed power control game by a small amount, still outperforming other feasible methods. In future work, we will seek to robustly formally prove the conjecture of social optimality with respect to the power control game presented here. Further future work will be to implement the individual stages of the repeated game, such that the number of players, or active networks, varies according to the inter-BAN TDMA access at different stages and then (with this varying number of players at different stages) to investigate the corresponding physical, link, and network layer characteristics employing an appropriate network-level simulator, such as Network Simulator Version 2 or 3 (NS-2 or NS-3).
